Virologist to make his case for lab origin of swine flu
By Peter Duveen
PETER’S NEW YORK, Wednesday, July 1, 2009--The scientist who made headlines in May by positing a
laboratory origin for the swine flu that has swept the world will defend his
theory in the scientific literature, Peter’s
New York has learned.
Dr. Adrian Gibbs, a Canberra,
Australia-based virologist with more than 200 scientific publications
to his credit, said that over the weekend he submitted his latest work
on the swine flu to a prominent scientific journal, and is awaiting a
response.
Gibbs, 75, was part of a team that developed the antiviral
drug Tamiflu.

Peter Duveen photo
In May of 2009, Dr. Adrian Gibbs of Canberra, Australia, shown here on Bloomberg TV, achieved notoriety for his theory
that the new swine flu may have been the result of an error in the vaccine manufacturing process.
Back in April, when the first cases of swine flu were
diagnosed in Mexico,
Gibbs examined the genetic structure of the virus that had been posted on a
public database. His analysis led him to speculate that the virus may have been
the result of a laboratory error. He contacted the Geneva, Switzerland-based World Health
Organization with his conjecture, and scientists there scrutinized his findings,
concluding, however, that the virus was most likely a product of nature.
In a series of email exchanges with Peter’s New York, Gibbs said he
was not satisfied with the WHO’s critique, indicating that the basis for it was
ambiguous.
“The WHO stated that they had no evidence to support my
suggestion,” Gibbs said. “They made a very fair statement. However the
principle reason for my conclusion remains—that none of the genes of the new
virus had been sampled/found/caused epidemics since at least 2000, despite
probably coming from at least two different parents on two continents, where other
strains had been sampled.”
Gibbs said that might have been a coincidence, but the
unusual placement of the virus on what what virologists call phylogenetic trees—a
sort of schematic family history of the virus--also piqued his interest. On top of that, Gibbs observed that there was
a lack of evidence that pig populations in North America,
from which the virus is believed to have emerged, had been infected. Only the
pigs on one farm in Canada
have as yet been shown to have contracted the virus.
It has been established, said
Gibbs, that swine easily contract the new flu from humans, and spread
it among themselves. The absence of infection in the North
American swine, Gibbs
noted, may be evidence that the swine had already contracted
the disease and built up immunity, or that they were vaccinated against
viruses that resembled the novel swine flu closely enough for them to
have been protected against it. Gibbs said the one Canadian herd that
came down with the novel swine flu had not been inoculated, and that
the evidence therefore leans toward inoculation as the reason North
American pigs are disease free. That, in turn, would support a theory,
according to Gibbs, that "the virus in the vaccine may be the immediate
progenitor of the new human virus. "
Gibbs said he would have been more satisfied if scientists
at the WHO had examined the lists of all the vaccines licensed for production
in the United States and Mexico
and determined that none of them harbored strains from which the swine flu could
have descended. He said he had been unable to locate such lists to make the
determination himself.
Gibbs spells out fairly clearly how he thinks the new virus
might have emerged due to a laboratory error. In manufacturing a vaccine, each
of the viruses to be protected against must first be bred and then sterilized
to prevent their further multiplication. When a subject is inoculated, the body
reacts to the “killed” viral fragments and produces antibodies that provide
protection against the live virus. Gibbs said that if the sterilization process
was not carried out properly, pigs could end up being given live viruses, and
instead of being protected, would contract the disease. The live viruses would then
have a chance to multiply and exchange genetic material within the infected pig
in a process known as reassortment, and a new virus could emerge and spread to
humans as a “swine flu.”
The study of viruses is overlaid with a complex nomenclature
and labyrinthine concepts and arguments in the field of genetics that are
unfamiliar to the average layman. But the implications are far reaching, a fact
not lost on the general public or on Gibbs.
Early this year, the Deerfield,
Ill. based drug firm Baxter International Inc. shipped experimental vaccines
for human flu that were contaminated with the bird flu. The cocktail of
influenzas, if it had not been discovered by alert laboratory specialists in
the Czech Republic in February, could have been administered
to subjects, after which, some experts feared, the two viruses could have
undergone reassortment, producing a new virus that possessed the lethality of
bird flu and the communicability of human flu. Bird flu is a deadly disease
that kills close to half its victims, but resists spread from human to human.
Human flu, on the other hand, is far more benign, but is easily spread through
human contact. A recombined virus with the characteristics of each of the two could
conceivably wipe out almost half the world’s population.
Gibbs steers clear of elaborate intrigues that some believe
are behind the new flu’s emergence. “Whenever I’ve thought something has
resulted from a conspiracy, it usually turns out to be from a ‘cock-up,’” he
said. The importance of establishing whether or not the flu emerged from a
laboratory, he emphasized, is “to try to avoid a recurrence.”
He did admit, however, that there was a definite risk to the
public of escaping pathogens held in government and private facilities.
“There are many historical precedents that are conveniently
forgotten,” said Gibbs. “The recent Baxter incident seems to have been one.”
“The reappearance in 1977 of the H1N1 (virus) last seen in 1950 after a period of
non-evolution,” which he speculated
could represent “suspended animation in a freezer,” was another instance in
which pathogens might have escaped from a laboratory. Gibbs also cited the
escape of foot-and-mouth disease from a British government laboratory facility
in 2007.
Asked if the resurrection of the viral agent for the deadly 1918
“Spanish” flu, which was reconstituted in 2005 by scientists at the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention for research purposes, was a safe proposition,
he answered, “No, definitely not.”
“It’s exactly the same principle as should apply to all high
security labs,” said Gibbs. “If it ain’t ‘there’ it can’t get out, whereas if
it is, then there is always the possibility, however remote, that it might get
out.”
The 1918 flu, which spread to every corner of the globe in
the two years immediately following World War I, had a rate of lethality some
30 to 50 times greater than other strains of human flu. Tens of millions of
people died in the pandemic worldwide.
While some aspects of his presentation have been updated, Gibbs
said his basic premise remains unchanged, and has, in fact, been reinforced by
recent additions to the scientific literature.
And while the WHO gave the appearance of having put the final nail in the
coffin of Gibbs’s theory, in a rare show of scientific honesty for a public
institution, it affixed the lid rather loosely, leaving itself room to revisit
Gibbs’s hypothesis once it is published.
In the mid-May press conference in which the WHO addressed
Gibbs’s analysis, which by that time has spread far and wide throughout the
mainstream media, Assistant Director Keiji Fukuda praised the virologist who
had contributed to the field for more than fifty years of professional work,
calling Gibbs “a credible scientist, a credible virologist.”
In answer to a reporter’s question about whether Gibbs’s
theory had been refuted, Fukuda said: “I think that it is fair to say that in
the world of science, nothing is ever totally excluded, nothing is ever ended.”
On the issue of whether Gibbs’s theory may actually prove true or not, he said:
“We feel very comfortable based on the analyses which have been done, based on
the rigor in which it has been looked at, that we are not dealing with a
laboratory-created virus. However, I do not expect that the debate itself will
stop.”
The world awaits Gibbs’s response.
[This article has been updated from the June 29th version. A paragraph
(the 8th) has been added and the dateline has been changed to reflect
the new version.]
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